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Abstract
This paper tests competing theoretical explanations for the passage of corporate charter
antitakeover amendments. The managerial entrenchment theory suggests that antitakeover
amendments are adopted by incumbent management to obtain job security at stockholders' expense.
The alternative hypothesis is that antitakeover amendments benefit stockholders by extracting a larger
share of synergistic gains between the bidder and target firm. Our event study from a sample of 409
firms that adopted antitakeover amendments in the 1974-1988 period indicates a strongly negative
effect on stockholder wealth in support of the managerial entrenchment hypothesis that antitakeover
amendments are adopted by managers at the expense of stockholders.
An Empirical Investigation of the Effect
of Corporate Charter Antitakeover Amendments
on Stockholder Wealth
Several mechanisms that influence the transfer of managerial control are now a research focus of
finance and business scholars. These mechanisms include greenmail (Bradley & Wakeman, 1983;
Dann & DeAngelo, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986b; Kosnik, 1987, 1990), golden parachutes
(Cochran, Wood & Jones, 1985; Knoeber, 1986; Lambert & Larcker, 1985; Singh & Harianto,
1989a, 1989b), poison pills (Davis, 1990; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988) and
antitakeover amendments (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987; Sundaramurthy, 1990; Walsh & Seward, 1990).
This study concentrates on corporate charter antitakeover amendments and is motivated by the
considerable controversy that surrounds the use of antitakeover amendments by United States'
corporations at the federal, state, and individual firm level. Antitakeover amendments are often the
most debated issues on the agendas of annual stockholder meetings (Pound, 1985).
Antitakeover amendments are intended to restrict the transfer of managerial control (Easterbrook
& Fischel, 1981). The study of the effect of antitakeover amendments on stockholder wealth has
produced mixed empirical evidence. DeAngelo and Rice (1983) found essentially no effect of
antitakeover amendments on stock price (stockholder wealth). Linn and McConnell (1983) found a
weak positive effect of antitakeover amendments on stockholder wealth. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987),
however, found a strong negative effect of antitakeover amendments on stock price. The considerable
debate concerning the stockholder wealth effects of antitakeover amendments motivates our empirical
research.
We consider competing theoretical explanations for the passage of antitakeover amendments
i derived from the agency theory literature (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1989). The
managerial entrenchment hypothesis posits risk averse managers who desire a reduction in
employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). Managerial preferences diverge from stockholders'
preferences, and antitakeover amendments are viewed as protecting inefficient and/or opportunistic
managers at the stockholders' expense. An alternative stockholder interests hypothesis suggests that
antitakeover amendments serve stockholders by strengthening the position of incumbent management
in dealing with corporate acquirers whose primary objective is to acquire the assets of the target firm
at an unreasonably low price.
The issue of whether the announcement of new information related to the proposal of antitakeover
amendments results in an increase or decrease in the wealth of stockholders is our empirical focus. In
particular, we concentrate on the stockholder wealth effects of supermajority amendments and
classified boards. Supermajority amendments and classified boards are nonoperating defensive
measures
1
and require stockholder approval (Walsh & Seward, 1990) (see Table 1). These corporate
charter amendments involve no direct effect on share price paid by potential acquirers (as do fair
price amendments) and involve no obvious direct wealth transfers to other stakeholders (as do "poison
pills").
Insert Table 1 about here
In addition to a direct transfer of wealth from stockholders to management, a possible signaling
effect may have an additional stock price impact (Szewczyk & Tsetsekos, 1990). If the market
interprets the antitakeover amendment as an indication of a management which is overly concerned
with protecting its own employment position, stock prices may reflect an extrapolation of current
actions indicative of opportunistic managers. If the market interprets the antitakeover amendment as
A nonoperating defensive measure does not necessarily directly affect the asset and/or
liability structure of the firm (i.e., the balance sheet), but nevertheless affects the probability of a
successful takeover attempt (Walsh & Seward, 1990).
managerial behavior consistent with the long-term interests of the firm, the stock price may reflect an
additional positive impact of indications of a responsible management.
Supermajority and classified board provisions almost always require the approval of a majority
vote by stockholders2 . Supermajority merger approval provisions typically stipulate stockholder
approval percentages in the 66 percent to 80 percent range. Various supermajority stockholder
approval requirements may block a bidder from implementing a merger even when the bidder controls
the target's board of directors. Supermajority amendments also typically include escape clauses. For
example, they are usually not applicable to mergers with a firm's subsidiary. If the board is able to
determine when and if the supermajority provisions will be in effect, the amendment is said to have a
board-out clause.
Classified board provisions segment (or stagger) the board of directors into classes with one class
standing for election each year. Typically, with a classified board provision, one-third of the board is
elected each year for a three-year term. With a classified board, a new majority stockholder would
have to wait for two annual meetings to attain majority representation on the board before being
guaranteed a successful proposal of a merger for stockholder vote. Amendments to classify the board
are often accompanied by an amendment specifying that supermajority approval by stockholders is
necessary to change the number of directors. The supermajority provision inhibits a bidder from
expanding the board and thus taking control of the board by electing candidates to the newly created
positions. Now let us consider these two corporate charter amendments in relation to the agency
literature.
2 An interesting question is put forth by Cary (1969): May a mere majority of the
stockholders institute a supermajority requirement?
The Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis
According to the managerial entrenchment view, the separation of ownership and control allows
entrenched managers a wide range of discretion (Berle & Means, 1932) including shirking (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976), top management featherbedding (Myers, 1983), taking fewer investment risks
(Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) and maintaining short time horizons that result in a present-value
loss for the firm (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984; Jensen & Meckling, 1979). The managerial
entrenchment hypothesis suggests that managers propose and support antitakeover amendments as a
pre-tender offer defensive tactic to reduce employment risk and to insulate themselves from
competition in the takeover market (Kesner & Dalton, 1985).
To be sure, many "institutions of capitalism" (Williamson, 1985) mitigate the agency problem of
the separation of ownership and control including: (1) the market for corporate control (Jensen &
Ruback, 1983; Marine, 1965); (2) competitive forces in the product market (Williamson, 1964); (3)
outside boards of directors who effectively monitor top management and limit its opportunism
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Friedman
& Singh, 1989; Mizruchi, 1983); (4) compensation plans based on performance (Coughlan &
Schmidt, 1985; Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Murphy, 1985; Walkling & Long, 1984);
(5) equity ownership by management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Knoeber, 1986; McWilliams, 1990);
(6) the external managerial labor market and the so-called "ex post settling-up mechanism" (Fama,
1980); (7) internal labor markets and the multidivisional internal capital market (Williamson, 1970);
(8) concentrated ownership (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Hill & Snell, 1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986a);
(9) increased monitoring by institutional investors (Brickley, Lease & Smith, 1988; Graves &
Waddock, 1990; Oviatt, 1988); and (10) corporate culture (Barney, 1986).
Those who hold the managerial discretion view do not deny that mechanisms have evolved which
lessen the problem of the separation of ownership and control (Walsh & Seward, 1990). The major
claims which are made by supporters of the managerial entrenchment hypothesis are the following: (1)
all of the institutions of capitalism listed above attenuate but do not eliminate managerial discretion
(Williamson, 1964, 1985); (2) reducing the effectiveness of the market for corporate control would
exacerbate the agency problem of the separation of ownership and control (Easterbrook & Fischel,
1981); and (3) uninformed stockholders may be in the majority, in which case stockholders may vote
to establish amendments which are not in their best interest (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987)3 .
Thus, managers are posited as exercising managerial discretion at the expense of stockholders
since disciplinary mechanisms are not perfect. The organization's managers are able to balance
commitments to various "stakeholders", to buffer the organization by maintaining slack resources, and
to serve the interests of the organization as a "going concern" (Commons, 1934) even if it comes at
the expense of stockholder wealth (March & Simon, 1958; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson,
1967).
The Stockholder Interests Hypothesis
The stockholder interests hypothesis posits that the adoption of antitakeover provisions increases
current stockholder wealth (Berkovitch & Khanna, 1990). Antitakeover amendments, by giving target
managements additional negotiating leverage or veto power, enable managements to negotiate better
deals on average for their stockholders.
In the full information case where the gains of merger are attainable through merger with a
potentially large number of bidding firms, antitakeover amendments are superfluous. The target firm
will already be able to appropriate the full gains between the bidding firm and target firm in the
3 Stockholders in widely held corporations do not have an economic incentive to closely
study every decision which is put to a stockholder vote. If, on average, the management's
recommendations lead to an increase in stockholder wealth then the stockholder with small holdings
has little incentive to monitor individual managerial decisions.
bidding process without additional safeguards such as antitakeover amendments (Bradley, 1980).
Thus, the stockholder interests hypothesis implicitly posits asymmetric information and/or a private
synergy between the target firm and bidding firm (Barney, 1988).
First, consider the case of asymmetric information. Suppose the current stock price, P^
($80), is common knowledge, but only the bidding firm knows the true ex post price of the target
firm PHIGH ($90). Suppose further that the target stockholders have a knowledge of the distribution of
the possible ex post stock price. In this case, a particular bid (say, P BID = $85) will induce a certain
percentage of the stockholders to tender their shares. We expect, of course, that the percentage of
stockholders that tender their shares to increase with PBID (i.e., the supply curve of tendered shares is
upward sloping in price).
In this case of asymmetric information, a supermajority amendment which requires 80 percent
stockholder approval rather that a simple majority of 51 percent will result in a higher P BID (say, $89)
for a successful takeover. The maximum share price that the bidding firm would offer is PHIGH ($90).
A successful takeover will surely make the target firm's stockholder better off under a supermajority
scenario relative to a simple majority, given that a takeover occurs . However, the supermajority
amendment also increases the likelihood that the takeover will not take place and the target firm's
shares will continue to sell for PL0W -
Next, consider the case of a private synergy between the bidding firm and the target firm due
to economies of scope in production (Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982), market power (Eckbo, 1983)
or informational economies (Bradley, Desai & Kim, 1983, 1988) which cannot be readily achieved by
contractual exchange (Williamson, 1975). A private synergy obtains when the value of the target
firm to the bidding firm is greater than the value of the target firm to any other bidder. The target
firm wants to extract as much of the synergistic gain as possible in this bilateral monopoly situation
with the bidding firm. However, the individual stockholders find that acting as a cartel is difficult
due to the incentive to cheat. As DeAngelo & Rice (1983) point out, in the case of a widely held
firm, property rights (Alchian, 1965) are not perfectly defined since any coalition of 51 percent of the
target stockholders can transfer voting control to the bidder. An inefficient 'rush' (from the target
stockholders' point of view) by individual stockholders to tender at the currently offered control
premium may result. A possibly effective way to counteract this inefficiency is to force the bidding
firm to deal directly with the board of directors of the target firm. The target firm's board should be
able to collude more effectively and at a lower cost than individual stockholders. Thus, antitakeover
amendments such as classified board provisions force the bidding firm to deal with a small, cohesive
group which may result in the extraction from the bidding firm of a larger percentage of the bilateral
monopoly gains.
The private synergistic value is analogous to the Klein-Crawford-Alchian (1978) notion of quasi-
rent . The target firm, of course, wants to appropriate as much of the quasi-rent as possible in this
bilateral monopoly case. Antitakeover amendments may serve the rent-appropriation objective for the
target firm (Grossman & Hart, 1980). The target stockholders potentially benefit from contractual
mechanisms which enforce a "stockholder cartel" in which the individual stockholder is encouraged to
hold-out for a higher tender price, approaching the bidder's maximum valuation of the target
(DeAngelo & Rice, 1983). The antitakeover amendment is viewed as an institutional response to a
free-rider problem associated with tender bids. Thus, antitakeover amendments which enable the
target firm's stockholders to appropriate a greater share of the synergistic gains can be viewed as a
special case of the insights of Schelling (1960) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) that voluntarily agreed
upon constraints can often benefit the constrained in corporate contracting.
Supermajority provisions, as illustrated above, increase the number of shares needed for
stockholder approval of a merger proposal. Supermajority provisions reduce the probability of losing
the control premium (the difference between the tender offer price and the expected share value of the
target firm following a successful offer) and therefore increase the incentives of the individual
stockholder to hold out for a higher offer. Antitakeover amendments help to force once-diffuse target
stockholders to respond in unison to takeover bids, and thereby to capture a larger share of the
economic gains from the perspective merger.
The stockholder interests hypothesis predicts that antitakeover amendments are adopted because
they benefit stockholders on net. Thus, the value to stockholders of an increased ability to extract
quasi-rents from bidders outweighs any additional costs which may include a lower probability of
merger or increased transaction costs such as legal fees to effect a merger.
Empirical Analysis
The efficient capital market theory provides a framework for the empirical testing of our
competing hypotheses (Bettis, 1983). We study stock price changes at the publication of news items
relating to antitakeover amendments. Methodologies based on the OLS market model and using
standard parametric tests are well-specified under a variety of conditions for daily stock return data
(Brown & Warner, 1980, 1985) and are utilized here.
The managerial entrenchment and stockholder interests hypotheses differ in the predicted stock
price impact of an antitakeover provision. The managerial entrenchment hypothesis suggests a
negative impact as wealth is diverted from stockholders to management as opportunistic and/or less
efficient managers protect their jobs. In contrast, the stockholder interests hypothesis suggests that
equity value will increase to capitalize the larger expected quasi-rent from the idiosyncratic synergy
gains. The managerial entrenchment and stockholder interests theories are empirically tested by
considering the equity value impact at the time of the antitakeover amendment proposal. The proxy
statement mailing date is utilized as the best available estimate of the date of the first public
announcement of antitakeover amendment consideration.
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Our sample of firms proposing antitakeover amendments is derived from several sources: (1)
DeAngelo and Rice (1983); (2) the Security and Exchange Commission (1985); and (3) the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (Rosenbaum, 1987, 1989). Our sample includes 409 firms adopting
supermajority and classified board amendments for the 1974-1988 period. This large sample should
reduce the level of statistical noise in measuring stock returns. The security market rates of return
utilized in testing were taken from the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices, University of
Chicago) daily file for firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange
and the National Association of Security Dealers.
We expect any resulting changes in stock prices, due to the perceived effect of antitakeover
amendments, to occur immediately around the proxy mailing date. We chose an event window of 50
days before the proxy mailing date (-50) to 10 days following the proxy mailing date (+ 10). An
average of 27 trading days (and a median of 24) separates the board meeting date (when an
amendment is passed) from the proxy mailing date (Linn & McConnell, 1983). Although it is against
SEC rules to actively solicit votes before the proxy mailing date, the possibility remains that the board
decision to adopt antitakeover amendments is leaked to some market participants. The market returns
in the -40 to -20 interval roughly surround the board meeting date. We chose 50 days before the
proxy mailing date to ensure the inclusion of the board meeting date. We chose 10 days after the
proxy mailing date as a sufficient time period for the market to fully react to the antitakeover
amendment provisions.
The statistical tests presented below consider the estimation of the market-price impact associated
with public announcement of proposed antitakeover amendments. We utilize capital market residual
analysis techniques (Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, 1969). If we assume that security returns have a
multivariate normal distribution, a single factor model consistent with the capital asset pricing model
(Lintner, 1965; Sharpe 1964) can be formulated for time-event studies. Therefore, the statistical tests
described below entail a joint hypothesis of market efficiency, the capital asset pricing model, and the
effects of antitakeover amendments.
Specifically, it is assumed that the market model is a valid representation of the stochastic process
which generates returns for security j in time period t.
% = (% + %%«+% (1)
where
Rp = stochastic return on security j over time period t
Rmt = stochastic return on a market portfolio of common stocks
over time period t, and
ejt
= disturbance term for security j at time period t which is assumed to be normally
distributed with zero mean, serially uncorrected and has constant variance over time.
According to the market model, each security's period t return is expressed as a linear function of
the corresponding time period's return on the market portfolio plus a random error term which
reflects security specific effects.
The market model is implemented by computing ex-post abnormal returns for each security as
ARjt = Rjt - (Sj + % Rmt ) (2)
where Rjt and Rmt are the observed returns for security j and the market portfolio, respectively, in
time period t relative to the event date of interest.
The security specific parameters a
}
and @-
}
are estimated over a period of 1 10 days (-160 to -51)
preceding the event date (Linn & McConnell, 1983). To reduce the impact of random estimation
errors, portfolios were formed in event time such that each daily abnormal return is an equally
weighted average of individual securities' abnormal returns for that common event date,
N
AR, = E ARjt / N,
j = l
10
where N is the number of securities in the portfolio on event date t. Cumulative average abnormal
returns are computed as:
t
__m
CAR, = L AR,,
,
k= -50
where t = -50 through +10.
To determine the statistical significance of the average abnormal returns, we employed a
parametric mean test as described in Linn & McConnell (1983). The statistic used to test the null
hypothesis is computed as:
2=^/5 (AR), (3)
where AR
t
= 1/N ( E AR^ )
j = l
l/:S (AR) = ( T-2/ (N (T - 4)) )
and AR^
t
= ARjt / S t(ARj
)
where
T
_
S t (ARj ) = ( Sj2 (1 + 1/T + 0C - RJ 2 / E (Rmt - RJ 2 ) ) 1/2
t=l
and
Sj2 = residual variance from the ordinary least squares estimation
of the market model for security j
R^ = average return on the market portfolio computed over the
same event period used to estimate the market model for
security j
T = total number of days in the interval used to estimate the
market model, and
N = number of securities in the portfolio of interest.
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The Z-statistic in (3) is distributed approximately unit normal for large N.
The test statistic of the null hypothesis that the cumulative average residual (CAR) is equal to zero
is computed as:
Zt = CAR, / S (AR), (4)
where
N ^
CAR, = (1/N E CARj
)
j = l
A T a
CARj =(SARj, ) / (T) 1/2
t=l
The Z-statistic in (4) is distributed approximately unit normal for large N.
Table 2 presents sample average and cumulative average abnormal rates of return for the event-
time surrounding the proxy mailing date for antitakeover amendments. For the event window (-50,
+ 10) the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) over the 61 day period decreased by 1.6
percent. The decrease in the CAR is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (see Figure 1).
The result is consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. 4
Insert Table 2 about here
Several methodological issues concerning event studies must be addressed (Brown & Warner,
1985). First, a pre-event period was chosen to estimate the parameters a and /5 in the market model.
These parameters may change due to the event, thus yielding potentially biased and inefficient
estimates for the market model. Changes in the parameter values are generally not a major concern
4
Formally, the hypotheses which we are testing are:
H : CAR 10 = Null hypothesis of no stockholder wealth effect
H 1A : CAR, > Supports the stockholder wealth hypothesis
H 1B : CAR 10 < Supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis
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when events are nonoperating, that is, when the events do not change the asset structure (business
risk) or the capital structure (financial risk) of a firm. We replicated our event study test using a
post-event estimation period (+ 1 1 to + 120) in place of our pre-event estimation period (-160 to -51)
to estimate a. and fi, and still found significantly negative CAR's, as expected.
Second, correlation among securities due to clustering of events in calendar time violates the
OLS assumption of contemporaneously uncorrected error terms. In this study, cross-correlation is
not viewed as a problem since the event dates are scattered through the years which we study. In
addition, the problem of non-synchronous trading (Scholes & Williams, 1977) was not considered a
major problem since the firms proposing antitakeover amendments are in general large, heavily traded
corporations.
Third, a consistent choice of market index is needed in order to properly interpret the results
(Brown & Warner, 1985). Thus, the equally-weighted market index was used in order to be
consistent with the equal weighting of the firms in the event-study portfolio.
Finally, we tested for increased variance around the event date which would violate the OLS
assumption of constant variance and would not allow standard interpretations of the t-tests for
significance. We could not reject the hypothesis that the residuals from the OLS regression (1)
above had the same variance before and after the event date, implying that constant variance is a
reasonable assumption.
The apparent robustness of our results raises questions about the conflicting empirical results
referred to in the introduction of this paper. We can reconcile these results if we look at the time
frames of these studies. Linn & McConnell (1983) included amendments from 1960 through 1980
and found marginally significant positive CAR's. DeAngelo & Rice (1983) studied the period 1974
through 1979 and found no significant impact of antitakeover amendment proposals on stockholder
wealth. Finally, Jarrell & Poulsen's (1987) study included amendments from 1980 to 1985 and found
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significantly negative CAR's. This apparent negative trend over time prompted us to break our
sample down by time period as well as by type of amendment.
Table 3 shows the results of the event-study methodology applied to various breakdowns of
our 409 firm sample. Table 3A contrasts the pre-1980 results with the post-1980 results. Before
1980, no (statistically or economically) significant returns were associated with the passage of
antitakeover amendments. After 1980, the antitakeover amendments were associated with significant
negative returns. These results, when viewed in light of previous research, imply that early
amendment passages (pre- 1975) generally induced positive cumulative average abnormal residuals,
mid-period amendment proposals (1975-1979) had no general impact on stock prices, and more recent
amendments (since 1980) have had significantly negative impacts on stockholder wealth. One can
conjecture reasons for the negative trend over time in the effect of antitakeover amendments.
Possible explanations include learning over time by stockholders (i.e., stockholders may update their
expectations of the effects of an antitakeover amendment after seeing the effects on firms which have
already passed them), changes in the structure of the takeover market5 (e.g., a more competitive
takeover market would decrease the overall benefits of antitakeover amendments), and changes in the
types of management which propose antitakeover amendments (e.g., perhaps early antitakeover
amendments were proposed by responsible managers who acted in the best interests of stockholders
but more recent amendments have been proposed by self-interested managers who propose the
amendments despite the negative share price effect).
Table 3B shows the breakdown of post-1980 antitakeover amendments by type, supermajority
or classified board. Each amendment shows similarly negative stock price effects (CAR's of
5 Many changes in the takeover market may have caused antitakeover amendments to have a
relatively larger effect on stockholder wealth in the 1980s relative to the 1970s. For example, state
antitakeover laws have been largely invalidated since 1982, and antitrust impediments have been
reduced for the merger of large firms and between competitors since 1980 (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987).
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approximately -2 percent), but only the results of the classified board provisions are significantly
negative due to the smaller sample size and large sample variance estimate of the supermajority
provisions.
Conclusions
Our empirical findings support the position of the U.S. Securities and Exchanges Commission
(SEC) and legal scholars such as Easterbrook and Fischel (1981). Antitakeover amendments are in
general contrary to the best interests of the stockholders of the firms that adopt them. Protective
responses while serving the interests of incumbent managements are dysfunctional from the standpoint
of the system as a whole (Williamson, 1975: 160-161).
Our results are particularly strong since the tests are biased against the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis. The proposal of antitakeover amendments may provide information, signaling an
increased probability that the firm may currently be a takeover target. The signal of a potential
bidder to the target stockholders empirically leads to an increase in the stock price. Thus, the
significant decline in the stock price around the event date of the antitakeover amendments, despite
the positive signaling effect, strengthens our interpretation of the evidence in support of the
managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
The observed stock-price reaction to antitakeover amendments has at least three components: a
negative component associated with the reduced probability of a successful offer, a positive
component associated with a lowering of the costs of negotiating higher-valued offers, and a positive
component associated with additional information about managers' expectations of a takeover. Our
empirical results indicate that the negative component outweighs the positive components. Moreover,
the negative stockholder reaction to corporate charter antitakeover amendments appears to have
increased over time.
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Thus, we reject the notion that takeovers play only a minor role in disciplining managers and that
efficient labor markets are sufficient to solve the problem of the separation of ownership and control.
The market reacts negatively when disciplining mechanisms placed on managers are circumvented by
those same managers.
We find unpersuasive the argument that since stockholders freely choose to vote in favor of
antitakeover amendments that they must be perceived as positive by stockholders. Jarrell and Poulsen
(1987) show that firms passing supermajority amendments have relatively low institutional
stockholdings (averaging 19 percent) and high insider holdings (averaging 18 percent), which we
interpret as helping to explain how these amendments received voting approval despite their harmful
wealth effects. Although higher insider holdings suggest greater financial interests to protect,
managers also have employment concerns as well. Thus, inside holders may trade-off wealth
accumulation for greater corporate control (Fortier, 1989).
Finally, it is important to note that although we found a negative average impact, this does not
preclude the possibility that some firms' antitakeover amendments actually benefit stockholders. Our
test is properly interpreted as providing evidence concerning the average effect of antitakeover
amendment proposals on stockholder wealth. With this important caveat clearly in mind, we have
been persuaded by the empirical evidence that antitakeover amendments are generally detrimental to
stockholders.
Tender offers and hostile takeovers are primary market mechanisms which encourage efficient
management and competitive firms. Antitakeover amendments subvert competition in the market for
corporate control.
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TABLE 1
Operating Nonoperating
Stockholder
Approval
Required
No Stockholder
Approval
Required
1
Example:
Dual-class
recapitalizations
3
1. Supermajority
amendments
2. Classified board
amendments
2
Example:
Poison pills
4
Example:
Golden
parachutes
Mechanisms intended to restrict transfer of managerial control (adapted from
Walsh & Seward, 1990, p. 438). This paper focuses on amendments in box 3.
>
TABLE 2
Daily abnormal returns surrounding the event date for
the proxy mailing for classified board and supermajority
provisions. (N=409)
Event Average CAR Event Average CAR
date residual date residual
-50 -0.0014 -0.0014 -15 -0.0016 -0.0161 **
-40 -0.0014 -0.0031 -14 0.0000 -0.0161 **
-39 -0.0003 -0.0034 -13 0.0008 -0.0153 **
-38 -0.0007 -0.0041 -12 0.0011 -0.0142 **
-37 -0.0018 -0.0059 * -11 0.0015 -0.0127 **
-36 -0.0014 -0.0074 * -10 0.0010 -0.0117 *
-35 -0.0005 -0.0079 ** -09 0.0000 -0.0117 *
-34 -0.0015 -0.0094 ** -08 -0.0004 -0.0121 *
-33 -0.0006 -0.0100 ** -07 -0.0007 -0.0128 *
-32 0.0019 -0.0081 * * -06 -0.0001 -0.0129 *
-31 -0.0014 -0.0095 ** -05 -0.0001 -0.0130 *
-30 -0.0001 -0.0096 ** -04 -0.0012 -0.0141 *
-29 -0.0001 -0.0097 * * -03 0.0013 -0.0129 *
-28 0.0012 -0.0084 * * -02 -0.0012 -0.0141 *
-27 0.0000 -0.0084 * * -01 -0.0007 -0.0147 *
-26 -0.0022 * -0.0106 ** 00 -0.0012 -0.0159 *
-25 -0.0010 -0.0116 * * +01 -0.0010 -0.0170 *
-24 -0.0002 -0.0118 ** +02 -0.0013 -0.0183 **
-23 -0.0012 -0.0130 ** +03 0.0010 -0.0173 *
-22 -0.0017 -0.0147 * * +04 0.0018 -0.0155 *
-21 0.0003 -0.0144 ** +05 0.0000 -0.0155 *
-20 0.0002 -0.0142 ** +06 -0.0014 -0.0170 *
-19 -0.0004 -0.0146 * * +07 -0.0013 -0.0183 *
-18 -0.0003 -0.0150 ** +08 -0.0006 -0.0188 *
-17 0.0018 -0.0131 ** +09 0.0012 -0.0176 *
-16 -0.0014 -0.0145 * * + 10 0.0016 -0.0160 *
* indicates that the average of the standardized residuals is
significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance
using a two-tailed test.
** indicates that the average of the standardized residuals is
significantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance
using a two-tailed test.
TABLE 3
Cumulative Average Abnormal Residuals 10 days after the event date (CAR 10 ) for
Classified Board and Supermajority provisions broken down by time period and
by amendment.
Table 3A PROVISIONS BY TIME PERIOD
1974-1979 1980-1988
Sample size (N ) 93 316
CARio -0.0032 -0.0197
t(CAR 10 ) -0.3746 -2.1738
Table 3B PROVISIONS BY TYPE
Classified Board
1980-1988
Supermajority Provision
1980-1988
Sample size (N } 192 118
CAR 10 -0.0196 -0.0237
t(CAR l0 ) -2.333 -0.7206
>
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